Regulation is an information problem. In this paper we show that benchmarking can have an important role to play in extracting information and providing efficiency incentives. However, the effectiveness of this role depends both on the credibility of the regulator to undertake a comparative efficiency analysis, and the impact of the benchmarking on the value of the firm. These are both affected by the policy framework within which the regulator operates. In Britain the regulator is not obliged to undertake any benchmarking, and the impact of the benchmarking that has been undertaken has been relatively low. These conditions have the effect of diminishing incentives for both information provision by the companies and model developments by the regulator. In the Netherlands, the impact on business value is high because benchmarking sets the price differentials from which a yardstick competition modelrequired by law -is implemented. These twin conditions of high credibility and high impact on value both sharpen incentives for the businesses to reveal information at 1 Misja Mikkers is also affiliated to the Department of Economics and Natural Resources, KVL, Denmark and to ENCORE, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 2 The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not represent those of the organisations in which they are employed.
explicit. Compared to the price control system described above, this approach weakens the link between the regulated businesses' future revenue and costs.
Given that benchmarking is required in many regulatory situations, in this paper we explore how the benchmarking process itself can be used to improve the quality of information available to regulators at price control reviews. A key issue to be explored in this paper is the extent to which information provision is endogenous to the regulatory context, that is, whether the regulatory framework can provide incentives to reveal good quality information that can then be used to improve the effectiveness of benchmarking analysis and the regulatory settlement more generally.
In exploring this issue, we also consider what bureaucratic means of data collection may be required that is also consistent with the regulatory framework.
We begin by setting out the key requirements to undertake a benchmarking study, and observe that perhaps the most significant obstacle to effective benchmarking is the availability of good quality data on existing costs. We then discuss, in section 3 the conditions under which benchmarking can be expected to be an effective tool to extract information from regulated businesses, then highlight the importance of these conditions by comparing the cases of the British and Dutch approach to the regulation of electricity distribution in section 4. In section 5 we illustrate how these conditions can also encourage model innovation, with an example from Austria, and in section 6 we draw together some conclusions.
As noted above, benchmarking is usually required to inform a regulatory settlement in one way or another. A key challenge 5 in any regulatory application of benchmarking is to identify a set of variables:
• that describes the tasks (the cost drivers) that most accurately and comprehensively explain the costs of a firm;
• that affect costs but cannot be controlled by the firm (environmental factors); and
• for which data can be collected consistently across all firms and with a reasonable effort.
As far as output variables are concerned, for electricity distribution, these are well understood and are summarised by Turvey (2004) . Essentially, if a total cost analysis is used then the appropriate outputs are those that are related to, and valued by, customers -throughput, peak demand and the number of connection points. If an operating expenditure approach is adopted, then these variables need to be supplemented by measures of the network that the costs are incurred to maintain.
Consequently, it is entirely to be expected that different model specifications will emerge if the efficiency question is different -the former specification is associated with measuring the long run efficiency of the industry, whilst the latter with the shortrun, taking the capital stock as given. It does not, as Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) appear to imply, suggest that there is no single correct model specification.
5
The choice of modelling technique is also an issue for a regulator to address, but we do not review these approaches in detail here and point to the overviews by Lovell et. al (1993) , Coelli et al. (1998 ), Coelli et al. (2003 .
it is the incorporation of these variables into the benchmarking analysis that has been a contentious issue in regulatory benchmarking. Later in this chapter we report particular innovations developed by the Austrian regulator, e-control.
As far as data is concerned, this has also been seen as an obstacle to the development of effective benchmarking. At the early stages of regulatory reform, efforts to implement higher powered forms of regulation can be frustrated by the lack of consistent data across the regulated businesses. The resolution of these data problems can take some time, by which time the impetus to introduce higher-powered regimes may have receded. Within this setting, information availability is often seen as exogenous, and this perception can drive the extent of a regulator's ambitions to move towards higher-powered arrangements in general, and the implementation of a benchmarking approach in particular.
Benchmarking is often perceived as a means of measuring relative efficiency in a sector, but as noted its effectiveness can be limited by data problems. If data availability is endogenous to the regulatory process, then clearly there is scope for benchmarking to provide incentives to elicit more information from regulated businesses on which better informed regulatory settlements can be made.
The proposition explored in this paper is that the extraction of information through benchmarking will be more successful in a regime where the impact of benchmarking on the value of the business is potentially high, and also where the regulator can credibly apply benchmarking to the businesses. If these conditions are met, then regulated businesses will face stronger incentives to submit relevant information more quickly than would otherwise be the case. Moreover, if these two conditions exist, the regulator faces stronger incentives to develop more robust measures of environmental factors that can explain differences in cost levels.
The impact of benchmarking on the value of the business will be higher:
• the wider the scope of the cost base exposed to benchmarking (i.e. total costs rather than the costs of a particular process);
• the clearer the link between the benchmarking and the final price control settlement; and
• the greater is credibility of the regulator to do benchmarking that has a significant impact on value.
The credibility 6 of the regulator to do benchmarking will be greater if:
• there is legal backing to both undertake the task and to reflect the results in the final settlement;
• the reputation of the regulator is built up through transparency and consistency of decision-making; and
• the impact on value is high.
There is therefore a strong sense in which these factors mutually reinforce one another in determining the overall character of the regulatory regime. For example, if the focus is on benchmarking of a relatively unimportant process, then the impact of benchmarking on the value of the firm will be low. As a consequence, the company has little incentive to provide good quality information, and the regulator has little incentive to develop the reporting guideline that accurately measures these costs, taking account of the different substitution possibilities between processes or inputs that each individual firm will have explored to different degrees. At the same time, low quality information will reduce the value of benchmarking and, thereby, potentially limit its role in a regulatory regime, so that even if a regulator is handed significant credibility to do the task by law, his incentives to maintain and build up that credibility will gradually diminish.
On the other hand, if benchmarking is applied to total costs, and if the results of the exercise feed directly to a price determination, then the potential impact on value is high. If the regulator has the legal authority to credibly apply such a regime, then the The reader is directed to Armstrong and Sappington (2002) , Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Laffont and Tirole (1993) , and the references therein, for a general analysis of optimal regulatory contracts under a range of commitment options in a dynamic environment.
value at risk for the businesses both encourages those businesses to supply information and encourages the regulator to further develop his credibility.
If, however, the regulator wishes to expose a large part of the cost base to benchmarking, but he does not have the legal authority to do so, then credibility needs to be built up over time, and the regulator will need to rely more heavily on bureaucratic means of data collection that will take time to develop.
In summary, the information made available to the regulator is a decision variable of the business, and can be influenced by credible regulatory actions. The choice of benchmarking method, and commitment to a credible regulatory approach based on this method, can influence the amount and quality of information provided. In particular, companies will react to signals from the regulator about how the information provided will be used in the benchmarking analysis and in the setting of future allowed changes in tariffs. In this sense information is endogenous in the benchmarking process and the regulator needs to consider how the system can be best used to extract honest information.
We now discuss two cases where regulators in both The Netherlands and Britain have used benchmarking in quite different ways, and then evaluate the impact on the provision of information in each case.
cases of The Netherlands and Britain

THE NETHERLANDS
Legal background
The 1998 energy law in the Netherlands requires that the regulator (DTe) sets in accordance with a CPI-X formula, and that the X factors should be the same for all companies. However, a common interpretation of the law was that it provided for a transitional period where the X factors may differ across the network operators.
Therefore, DTe wanted to use the period of the first price control (2001) (2002) (2003) as a transition period to bring prices in line with estimated efficient cost levels through the use of firm-specific X factors, after which a generic X factor could be applied across the sector from the second regulatory period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) onwards by setting a uniform X-factor. This uniform X-factor would be based on the average productivity change of all firms.
Approach to benchmarking
DTe had only one year to undertake the first price control review. It considered the information available, and recognized that it was scant. Information requests were issued but the response was variable, with companies struggling to meet the deadlines and many submissions only partly completed. This is a special court for companies. It is a court in the first and only instance, which means that parties cannot appeal against decisions of the court.
, a particularly important part of this process was that DTe will adjust the opening value of allowed revenues at the start of each future price control period for the difference (in NPV terms) between the assumed change in productivity in the previous period and the actual change in productivity.
This essentially returns the present value of outperformance of the industry over the previous period, relative to the expectation that DTe had of its productivity, back to customers, and essentially reflects the position of the DTe which is that the industry cannot 'beat the regulator.' Consequently, to the extent that the industry inefficiency was under-estimated, the NPV of that will be returned to customers at the next review. This reinforces the objective of the scheme, which is that firms compete with each other, rather than the regulator's estimates of their costs.
10
Details are provided in section 8 of Annex A to the decision approving the method for determining the price cap to promote efficient operations (Decision 100947-82, 11 September 2003) .
Evaluation of the information process
Within DTe, there have been, and continue to run, a number of workstreams, (relating to structural differences 11 , quality regulation 12 and regulatory accounting rules 13 ) designed to complete the regulatory reform process that began in 1999.
Notwithstanding this work in progress, it is still possible to evaluate the process to date. In doing so, it is necessary to consider both the process itself, and the outcomes of the process. Clearly, the process itself was long -the companies availed themselves of all possible appeal mechanisms, and a final decision on the first price control took four years from start to finish. However, this decision also included a decision on the second price control period, and given that a standard price control review in the UK utility sector takes more than two years from start to finish, this does not seem to be particularly excessive.
Since the methodology barely changed throughout the course of the process, the outcome of the review at particular stages was very sensitive to the information provided to DTe. In the early stages of the process this may have created a state of uncertainty amongst the companies. However, as the companies began to understand both the law, and the methodology, it became clear that they also understood that an obvious route to avoiding a regulatory downside was to present better information to
11
DTe agreed with the companies to study the differences in circumstances again. This work is ongoing, and will provide the final set of adjustments to relative prices across the companies. In this respect, the approach adopted in Austria, referred to below, may prove informative.
12
Yardstick competition schemes that cover only prices and do not penalize network failures can lead to under-investment. In contrast -as shown e.g. in Mikkers and Shestalova (2003) − the socially optimal outcome can be achieved by introducing penalties for undersupply equal to the value of the associated losses perceived by the customers. DTe implemented such scheme after a change in the law − starting January 1, 2004 (see the decisions of October 8, 2004 for more information regarding the method and the consequences for individual network companies).
13
After the first standardization of capital cost, both the regulated firms and DTe realized that guidelines about cost accounting were needed. A first version of the Regulatory Accounting Rules is now published, and these guidelines cover, for example, the accounting of investments, cost allocation rules, provisions etc. DTe and the regulated companies will continue to evaluate and improve the Regulatory Accounting Rules.
the regulator. In this sense, the incentive to provide information was clearly linked to the credibility and value of the benchmarking regime.
Therefore, as a consequence, a clearly beneficial outcome of the process was better information provision. At the outset of the first price control review the data made available to DTe was not of a good quality. Capital cost information in particular was scant, but also the reporting of operating expenditures and output variables. In view of its statutory responsibilities DTe was able to use benchmarking as a credible instrument to elicit more and better information from the businesses. Within the first three years of its first determination, DTe had used the process to successfully elicit all relevant cost information -including capital cost data -to enable a comparable total cost measure to be constructed, and all output measures, to enable benchmarking. In doing so, and recognising the work that is currently ongoing, the process facilitated the implementation of the non-discretionary light-touch, yardstick competition regulatory system, which is now in place
14
. These information benefits are substantial.
The ingredients of these beneficial outcomes are as follows:
• a common interpretation of the law as requiring yardstick competition as the long run model of regulation;
• a legally determined (and very fast) timetable for the first price control;
• a consistent methodological approach adopted by DTe at every stage of the process;
• a transparent appeals process; and
Other benefits included a set of initial price controls that were unlikely to lead to the legitimacy problems that existed in the UK in the early 1990s, for example (see Burns and Weyman-Jones, 1995) .
so reaffirmed its commitment to DTe's approach.
Of these, perhaps only the last was not anticipated. Its effect however was beneficial.
All of these ingredients established DTe's credibility and established that the full value of the network business was determined as part of the process, and this provided strong incentives for the network operators to participate in information provision.
In terms of whether the means justified the ends, this would require an assessment of the costs of the review that were borne in the first four years, set against the very low administrative costs that are expected in future as the review process becomes more automated. In addition, the efficiency benefits of the yardstick regime would need to be compared to a counterfactual. It is difficult to establish a counterfactual, but in principle it can be expected that a functioning yardstick regime can yield greater welfare benefits 15 .
On balance, our qualitative assessment is that the process -whilst capable of some improvement -has provided strong incentives for information revelation, and this information has been effectively used for the purposes both of setting price controls, and for establishing an automatic process of regulatory updating that is consistent with the legal requirements that have been imposed upon DTe.
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Nillesen and Pollitt (2004) is one of the few papers to attempt to assess the welfare effects of the Dutch approach. Their paper has three weaknesses, however: first, it misunderstands the process of using the benchmarking process as an instrument to extract information that will necessarily imply that the X factors will change as new information is revealed. Second, it does not account for the dynamic welfare effects of a high-powered, light-touch set of regulatory arrangements on future productivity performance. Thirdly, and more seriously, their calculation of customer detriment (which appears to be based on their view that the regulator under-estimated inefficiency in the final proposals) does not appear to take account of a key principle established by DTe at the time of the final proposals for the updating of price controls that is described above.
BRITAIN
Legal background
Electricity distribution charges in Britain are regulated by Ofgem (formerly Offer).
Ofgem's duty is to protect and advance the interests of consumers by promoting competition where possible, and through regulation only where necessary. In meeting this objective Ofgem must have regard to the need to secure that all reasonable demands for electricity are met; and the need to secure that licence holders are able to finance the activities that are the subject of the obligations that have been imposed upon them. There is no specific requirement in the legislation to impose a price control formula and no guidance on how the price control formula should be set.
There is no indication in the legislation of whether, or how, benchmarking should be used 16 .
The absence of a clear legal framework suggests that to the extent that Ofgem would wish to move in the direction of high-powered regulation supported by benchmarking, it would need to develop a reputation for doing so through repeated actions. In this section we examine the evolution of benchmarking to assess the extent to which the regulator has developed such a reputation, and the extent to which it has consequently encouraged businesses to respond through revealing better information.
16
In contrast, comparative efficiency was established as an element of the RPI-X regime in the water sector in England and Wales at privatisation. While the legislation pertaining to the setting of prices and the licence conditions do not explicitly require benchmarking analysis the legislation relating to mergers in the sector require that mergers of larger water companies (WaSCs) are automatically referred to the Competition Commission and that, when assessing the impact of the merger, due regard is given to the potential impact on the regulator's ability to undertake comparative efficiency analysis. Formal credibility is therefore higher in the water sector, although in this case also, the regulator would need to develop a reputation for benchmarking through repeated actions.
Approach to benchmarking
Electricity distribution charges are set using the RPI-X control. The allowed annual change in charges is determined using a building block approach, where operating expenditure, depreciation and the return on the regulatory capital value are assessed separately. Price reviews in the electricity distribution sector were held in 1994 (with a 're-review ' in 1995), 1999 and 2004 . Comparative efficiency analysis is one tool that has been used at all price reviews since privatisation to assess the required future operating expenditure of the distribution network operators. However, bottom-up process benchmarking has also been a feature of the price control reviews.
At all three reviews the regulator used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) The composite variable used in the 2004 review was identical to that used in the 1999 review. No assumption was made about the size of the constant in the regression analysis. Ofgem also considered two alternative regression models including total costs (using a non-standard measure of operating expenditure plus ten-year average capital expenditure) and combined operating expenditure data to reflect ownership groups as the dependent variables. When setting efficiency targets Ofgem used the higher of the efficiency score from the standard regression analysis or the average efficiency score of the three regression models. Quality of service was found insignificant in the regression analysis and was therefore not included, while a separate adjustment was made for the effects of mergers. A DEA cross check was also used, although Ofgem argued that the results were implausible and were therefore not used.
There has thus been some consistency in the methodology used by Ofgem when benchmarking companies operating expenditure, although the most recent review has seen the regulator attempt to incorporate a range of additional factors, at least on a partial basis, into the analysis. The definition of the benchmark to which the companies were expected to catch-up, and the length of time allowed for catch-up, has changed somewhat from one review to the next. In 1994, the benchmark was not 
Data gathering
The benchmarking analysis at each price control was based on actual operating expenditure data for one year (1992/93, 1997/98 and 2002/03 respectively), with adjustments made by the regulator in an attempt to develop a consistent dataset across the businesses, based upon the business plans submitted to the regulator for the price review.
This task has become progressively more difficult, reflecting a concern that costs are accounted for in quite different ways across the industry in respect of, for example, the relationship between non-operational capital expenditure and operating expenditure, capitalisation policies, cost allocations and attributions, one-off or exceptional costs, regional factors, intra-company margins, and fault-related expenditure.
Dealing with these problems is not straightforward, but it is noticeable that Ofgem has chosen to deal with them as part of each price control review rather than as part of an ongoing process of developing regulatory accounting guidelines, despite numerous consultations on this issue
17
. Consequently, the scope to undertake panel data analysis is not available to Ofgem, but the more general observation is that it appears that Ofgem has to learn about the costs of the industry, all over again, at each price review. With no institutional memory of the businesses it regulates, either in the form of historic data or in the staff who undertake the review (which tends to be different for each review), it progressively loses the credibility to make an informed assessment of business efficiency.
This backdrop of reduced understanding of the cost base over time, coupled with the application of the building block approach both distorts actual input choices and weakens the incentive of any company to provide any more information than is explicitly required for the purpose of the efficiency review
18
. Furthermore, the absence of any meaningful accounting guidelines and historical data on costs, companies are able to present information in the knowledge that it will consume significant amounts of time and effort for the regulator to even make sense of the information, before it can move on to analyse it. In 2004, for example, Ofgem noted that 'considerable resource has been applied' to the data normalisation process.
17
In contrast, Ofwat introduced accounting guidelines shortly after privatisation and has spent significantly less time at each review trying to normalise for different accounting policies, because it collects detailed cost and output data from companies in annual June (previously July) Returns. This information corresponds to that used in comparative efficiency analysis at each review and provides a consistent time series of information for each company, allowing the regulator to cross-check business plan information to that provided in annual returns.
18 See, for example, Frontier Economics (2003) .
Settlement
In the run-up to privatisation in 1990, prices were increased significantly, and at privatisation, distribution operators were permitted to increase charges by RPI+1% on average. The distribution price reviews of 1994 and 1995 removed some this largesse and imposed a package of one-off price cuts and X factors that had the effect of setting prices as if they had been on an RPI-3% track since privatisation through to 2000. At the 2000 review, prices fell again in real terms through a one-off price reduction of around 15% on average, and an X factor of 3%, which largely returned the efficiency gains made in 1995 and 1996 to customers. It was at this point that Domah and Pollitt (2001) have calculated that customers finally began to gain from the privatisation of the electricity distribution companies some ten years earlier. At the latest review however, Ofgem increased charges by 1.3% on average in the first year, followed by a zero X factor.
Evaluation of the process
Quite clearly, the approach to benchmarking adopted by Ofgem has not provided strong incentives to reveal good quality information, and in fact may have led the regulated businesses to provide a distorted picture of their underlying cost base. In this sense the low credibility of the regime and the low value of the benchmarking regime have become, to some extent, reinforcing. The regulator has little incentive to increase the impact of benchmarking on value given the absence of credibility and concern about the quality of information provided. At the same time, the regulator has failed to use benchmarking, and the opportunity to collect better quality information on a regular basis, to develop a reputation for credibility that might, in itself, improve the quality of information and hence the value of the benchmarking.
That this is so clear is also due to the fact that Ofgem has not sought to apply the bureaucratic procedures to obtain information that are a feature of Ofwat's approach. As well as providing incentives for companies to submit information, a high-value, high-credibility regime can also impart incentives on the operator to account for environmental effects more rigorously. In Austria, where the regulator -E-controlhas powers similar to those of DTe, it recognised that the implementation of a yardstick model required its thinking on the role of cost drivers to be further developed. Consequently, it worked with the companies to develop an approach to variable selection that reflects the engineering characteristics of the systems.
The analysis that underpins the Austrian approach is Model Network Analysis This analysis has, for example, shown load density and connection density to be key drives of asset requirements and therefore of investment. It was also shown that the relationship between cost and connection density is non-linear 22 -a doubling of the
20
To the extent that operating expenditures, e.g. for network maintenance, stand in firm relationship to the asset base the MNA also allows exploring operating expenditures.
21
Fritz/Lüdorf/Haubrich (2002), Fritz/Zimmer (2004) , Katzfey et al. (2004) .
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In fact a square root relationship was found. That is, the (capital) cost of a network in a given area do not increase proportionately with the number of connections but with a square root relationship.
connection density does not lead to costs falling by a half, but by less than that. This implies that geographic heterogeneity could also be a significant cost driver.
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Whilst this approach cannot serve as an absolute benchmark for each network, it can serve as a relative benchmark which can be used to produce refined proxies for the complexity of the operating environment of the different firms, either in terms of the physical assets (mains length, transformers, etc.) or their financial value. The relative comparison of hypothetical asset levels between firms could allow for a refined comparison of the complexities of different supply tasks that different companies face. In practice, a simpler approach (with a similar effect) was adopted which used the output of the MNA to define a range of output and environmental factors for inclusion in the benchmarking model.
In small samples in particular, it is often difficult to distinguish between a variable that explains higher cost companies and a variable that is simply correlated with inefficiency. The use of the MNA provided an objective basis for including or excluding variables in a benchmarking analysis that is free of this concern. The Austrian work revealed a set of variables that were objectively justified by engineering analysis, were exogenous to the operators, which limited the need for extensive data collection, and which formed the basis of the variable selection process.
Given that the appropriate choice of environmental factors is the most contentious issue in benchmarking analysis, in our view this approach can be fruitfully developed to reflect more complex factors in an operating environment, and can evolve into a
For example the (capital) cost in Network A, which has the same area as Network B but twice the numbers of connections would be SQR(2) times the cost of Network B.
For the purpose of efficiency comparison geographically differentiated measures of connection density can be aggregated into a uniform variable by summing the density measures with a weighting by the size of the respective area.
summary measure of network complexity to be used directly in a benchmarking process.
The development of model innovations such as this allows for the credibility of benchmarking to be enhanced and increases the robustness of the benchmarking results. The impact on efficiency will be enhanced, particularly if the efforts of the regulator to create a high quality benchmarking exercise incentivises the companies to react to the high value-high credibility regime by providing quality data to underpin the benchmarking model.
